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Cet article étudie l’eﬀet des contraintes de ﬁnancement sur les changements dans le nombre
de marchés sur lesquelles les ﬁrmes exportent. Un modèle est développé dans lequel un moindre
accès aux ﬁnancements externes, ou en manque de ressources internes, détériorent la capacité
à ﬁnancer les coûts d’exportation récurrents et réduisent la probabilité de maintient sur les
marchés étrangers. De plus, les contraintes ﬁnancières sont un obstacle à l’expansion des ex-
portations parce qu’elles réduisent la capacité à payer les coûts d’accès à des nouveaux marchés
; de ce fait elles conduisent les ﬁrmes à éviter la perte de destinations d’exportation. Pour
tester les prédictions de ce modèle, nous utilisons une base de données longitudinale combinant
une information sur les destinations des exportations des ﬁrmes et des variables de contraintes
ﬁnancières au niveau individuel. Nous obtenons deux résultats. Premièrement, les contraintes
de ﬁnancement ont un impact négatif sur le nombre de nouvelles destinations d’exportations.
Deuxièmement, les contraintes de ﬁnancement sont associées à une probabilité plus élevée de
sortie des marchés d’exportations ; ceci étant compatible avec des contraintes qui limiteraient
principalement la capacité à payer les coûts d’exportation récurrents.
Mots-clés : Hétérogénéité des ﬁrmes, contraintes ﬁnancières, exportation
Codes JEL : D24, F14, D92
Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of credit constraints on the expansion and survival of ﬁrms
in foreign markets. It develops a model in which, lower access to external ﬁnance, or reduced
internal liquidity, hampers the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance the recurrent costs to serve foreign markets
and decreases ﬁrm survival in foreign markets. Additionally, ﬁnancial constraints act as a barrier
to ﬁrm export expansion by decreasing the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance the entry costs into new export
markets; thus, they push ﬁrm to avoid losing destinations. We use a unique longitudinal dataset
on French ﬁrms that contains information on export destinations of individual ﬁrms and allows
us to construct various ﬁrm-level measures of ﬁnancial constraints to test these predictions. We
obtain two main results. First, credit constraints have a negative eﬀect on the number of newly
served destinations. Second, higher probability of exit from the export market is also associated
with credit constraints; that is consistent with constraints limiting the ﬁnancing of recurrent
export costs.
Keywords: Firm heterogeneity, ﬁnancial constraints, trade
JEL classiﬁcation: D24, F14, D92
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is growing evidence that credit constraints are an important determinant of global trade
patterns. An important ﬁnding of recent trade literature is that there are sizeable ﬁxed costs
associated with entry into export markets (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das, Roberts and Tybout,
2007). In the presence of imperfect capital markets some ﬁrms that could proﬁtably export may
not do so because investors will not be willing to ﬁnance their trade costs (Chaney, 2005; Manova,
2010). This suggests that ﬁnancial constraints will have an eﬀect on trade ﬂows by determining
the composition and number of ﬁrms that enter export markets and thus aﬀect aggregate trade
ﬂows and the competitiveness of countries.
The goal of this paper is twofold: we focus on disentangling the eﬀects of credit constraints
for, on the one hand, ﬁrms’ expansion and, on the other hand, survival in export markets; and
to exploit a French ﬁrm dataset providing rich information on exports and ﬁnancial constraints.
First, we develop a simple theoretical model in which credit constraints inﬂuence ﬁrm expansion
and survival through the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance sunk entry costs and the recurrent ﬁxed costs to
serve an export market. The model suggests that ﬁnancial constraints have a negative impact
on ﬁrm expansion in foreign markets by limiting ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance entry costs and reducing
the number of newly created export relations. Additionally, the eﬀect of credit constraints on
survival in export markets is ambiguous. In the presence of credit constraints the probability
that a ﬁrm survives in the export market is reduced because liquidity strapped ﬁrms may not be
able to ﬁnance the recurrent per-period costs to stay in the market. On the other hand, lower
availability of credit increases the option value of staying in the export market. Since the ﬁrm
k n o w st h a ti tw o u l db ed i ﬃcult to ﬁnance the sunk cost of entry, should the ﬁrm exit and decide
to re-enter in the future, the ﬁrm increases its eﬀorts to avoid losing the destination.
For this purpose, we, ﬁrst, develop a simple theoretical model in which credit constraints
inﬂuence ﬁrm expansion and survival in export markets through the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance sunk
entry costs and the recurrent ﬁxed costs to serve an export market. While ﬁnancial constraints
negatively impact ﬁrm expansion in foreign markets by limiting the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance entry
costs and reducing the number of newly created export relations, the eﬀect of credit constraints
on export markets survival is ambiguous. In the presence of credit constraints the probability
that a ﬁrm survives in the export market is reduced as liquidity strapped ﬁrms cannot ﬁnance
the recurrent per-period costs to stay in the market. On the other hand, lower availability of
credit increases the option value of staying in the export market. Since the ﬁrm knows that it
would be diﬃcult to ﬁnance the sunk cost of entry, should the ﬁrm exit and decide to re-enter
in the future, the ﬁrm increases its eﬀorts to avoid losing the destination.
We test these predictions empirically using a ﬁrm-level dataset for France. The dataset we
use merges the Banque de France’s FIBEn survey and French customs data and is particularly
well suited for this analysis. First, contrary to most datasets used in the literature, contains
p r e c i s ei n f o r m a t i o no ne a c hﬁr m s ’e x p o r t st oa n yd e s t i n a t i o ni nag i v e ny e a r ,t h u sa l l o w i n gt o
2analyze the dynamics of entry and exit into the export market. In addition, its panel dimension
allows to control for ﬁxed ﬁrm characteristics and trends. Second, the dataset also has precise
information on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial ratios providing several measures of ﬁrms’ credit constraints. In
addition to standard measures of liquidity and trade credit, it also contains unique information
on ﬁrms that default on trade creditors that allows to construct an indirect measure of credit
constraints. A ﬁnal advantage of the dataset is its representativity of the overall population
of French exporters; it contains information on ﬁr m sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent size classes including an
important number of small and medium ﬁrms that are particularly likely to be aﬀected by
ﬁnancial constraints.
Equipped with this ﬁrm level information on export destinations and credit access, we regress
the number of entries and the number of exits on ﬁrm credit access, controlling for ﬁrm pro-
ductivity, ﬁrm size and unobserved heterogeneity. The empirical results conﬁrm the theoretical
predictions. Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, credit constraints have a
negative impact on the expansion of ﬁrm activities abroad through their negative impact on
the number of newly served export destinations. Second, credit constraints not only deter ﬁrm
entry into export markets, but also have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm survival in the export market
by increasing the probability that a ﬁrm exits export markets and thus the number of exits from
the export market. Therefore credit constraints, by preventing ﬁrms from entering new export
destinations, and by prompting them to quit export markets, reduce the overall number of ﬁrms
that export and decrease aggregate exports in the long run. These results are robust to using
diﬀerent indicators of ﬁrms’ credit constraints and diﬀerent deﬁnitions of entry and exit.
This paper contributes to a recent literature on trade and ﬁnance that investigates the
linkages between ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial constraints and international trade. On the theoretical
side, two recent works develop novel theories that help to understand how ﬁnancial constraints
aﬀect ﬁrm trade activities. First, Chaney (2005) extends Melitz’s (2003) dynamic industry model
with heterogeneous ﬁrms to consider the possibility that ﬁrms face liquidity constraints in the
ﬁnancing of the costs to enter export markets. A main prediction of his model is that credit
constraints will lead to suboptimal entry into export markets and ﬁnancial underdevelopment
will decrease a country’s aggregate exports by restricting the number of ﬁrms that export.
The main underlying mechanism is that if ﬁrms must pay some entry costs to access foreign
markets and if they face internal liquidity constraints to ﬁnance these costs, then only ﬁrms with
enough liquidity will export. Second, Manova (2010b) develops a more sophisticated modeling
of ﬁnancial constraints that Chaney (2005) by introducing the possibility that ﬁrms can borrow
externally to ﬁnance their trade costs and considering diﬀerences across sectors in external
ﬁnance dependence and asset tangibility. Her model yields the interesting prediction that in the
presence of credit constraints a country aggregate export will depend on the country level of
ﬁnancial development and its productive structure.
On the empirical side, a few studies provide micro-level evidence on the importance of
3ﬁnancial constrains for ﬁrm trade activities (e.g. Campa and Shaver 2002, Bellone et al 2010,
Greenaway et al 2007, Muûls 2008, Berman and Héricourt 2010, Bricongne et al 2010, Minetti
et Zhu 2011). These studies shed new light on the link between export status and ﬁrm ﬁnancial
health and on the ways in which ﬁnancial frictions restrict ﬁrms export participation.1 On
the link between ﬁnancial health and export status the existing studies give mixed results.
Greenaway et al. (2007) using panel data for UK ﬁrms ﬁnd that participation in export markets
improves a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health, but ex-ante ﬁnancial health has no eﬀect on the probability
that a ﬁrm enters export markets. On other hand, Bellone et al. (2010) reach opposite con-
clusions using French ﬁrm-level data. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms that enjoy better ex-ante ﬁnancial
health are more likely to start exporting and participation in export markets does not lead to
better ﬁnancial health.
Closer to our work, Berman and Héricourt (2010) ﬁnd that credit constrained ﬁrms are less
likely to become exporters using ﬁrm-level data for several developing and emerging economies.
In addition their results show that ﬁnancial constraints do not inﬂuence the probability of staying
in export markets and neither ﬁrm’s export volumes, suggesting that sunk entry costs are the
most important hurdle for credit constrained ﬁrms, while the ﬁnancing of ﬁxed and variable
trade costs seems not to be inﬂuenced by credit constrains. Moreover, Muûls (2008) tests the
empirical implications from Manova’s (2010b) model and conﬁrms the ﬁndings that liquidity
constrained ﬁrms are less likely to become exporters. She also ﬁnds that ﬁrms with easier access
to ﬁnance earn greater export revenues and export more products in line with the idea that ﬁrms
need external funds to overcome both ﬁxed and variable costs of exporting. Matching together
export data with ﬁrm-level credit constraints, Bricongne et al. (2010) show that during the 2008-
2009 crisis credit constraints emerged as an aggravating factor for ﬁrms active in sectors of high
ﬁnancial dependence. Having experienced a payment incident over the past year has a negative
impact on the ﬁrm’s export growth rate in normal time; during the crisis the negative impact
is heightened but the authors argue that the overall contribution of credit constraints on the
trade collapse was limited. Recently, using a survey on 4700 Italian ﬁrm including responses on
ﬁnancial statements, Minetti and Zhu (2011) ﬁnd in cross-section that credit rationing reduces
dramatically both the probability of exporting and foreign sales.
Our paper completes to this literature on two aspects. First, it provides an analytical
framework for disentangling how ﬁnancial constraints interact with ﬁrm entry, on the hand, and
ﬁrm exit from foreign markets, on the other hand; it shows that the impact on ﬁrm exit is
ambiguous depending on the nature of the constraint. And second, it provides new empirical
evidence showing that ﬁnancial constrains have a negative eﬀect on the expansion and survival
of ﬁrms in export markets; also, in contrast with Minetti and Zhu (2011), the time dimension in
1Other studies investigate whether ﬁnancial constraints matter for entry into export markets using data for
diﬀerent countries. Manole and Spartarenau (2010) ﬁnd that Czech exporters are less ﬁnancially constrained than
non-exporters and that less constrained ﬁrms self-select into exporting rather than exporting alleviating ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial constraints. Arndt et al. (2009) ﬁnd that less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are more likely to start
exporting using German data.
4our dataset allows the use of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical
prediction of the impact of credit constraints on ﬁnancing recurrent costs on foreign market.
The joint consideration of ﬁnancial constraints on entry and exit allows a better understanding
of the drivers of ﬁrm trade dynamics and of the extensive margin of trade, i.e. the number of
ﬁrms that export in an economy, which are important drivers of aggregate export ﬂows.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop a simple theoretical model
describing the relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and export market entry and exit.
Section 3, describes the dataset and discusses the ﬁrm-level measures of ﬁnancial constraints.
Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and section 5 presents the baseline results. Section
6 provides some extensions and tests the robustness of our results with respect to alternative
deﬁnitions of entry and exit. The last section concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
This section derives a simple theoretical model to study the relationship between credit con-
straints and ﬁrm entry and survival into export markets.
The main outcome of the model is that credit/liquidity constraints reduce the probability
to enter a new destination because credit constrains limit the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance the entry
costs. But the impact of credit
constraints on the exit from the export market is ambiguous. If ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect
the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance the recurrent costs then the probability to exit a destination is higher.
However, if credit constraints aﬀect the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance entry costs then the probability
to exit the market is lower as the ﬁrm will increase its eﬀorts to stay in the destination.
2.1 Without Credit Constraints
Consider a given country x,t h eﬁrm can be currently an exporter or not. Assume ﬁrst the case
that the ﬁrm is already exporting to x.B u tt h eﬁrm faces an exogenous probability h to lose
this market. This probability is mitigated by the expenses of the ﬁrm to maintain this foreign
market; typically, the ﬁrm supports its distribution network in x, actually ex ante gaining π1.
To maintain its foreign market the ﬁrm incurs recurrent ﬁxed costs that involve distribution and
servicing costs. Formally, reducing by p1 the probability of quitting the market is associated
with a recurrent ﬁxed cost cp2
1/2.L e tV x
1 the asset value of the destination x for the ﬁrm when
it exports in x,a n dV x
0 the value when the ﬁrm does not export. We have the following relation
rV x
1 = π1 +( h − p1)(V x
0 − V x
1 ) − cp2
1/2, (1)
where r is the interest rate.
5Assume now that the ﬁrm does not export to x.T h eﬁrm incurs foreign market entry costs
cp2
0 for a probability p0 to enter in the market x. These entry costs may include the costs of
packaging, upgrading product quality, establishing marketing channels, building up information
on demand. We have thus:
rV x
0 = p0(V x
1 − V x
0 ) − cp2
0/2. (2)
The ﬁrst order conditions give
cp∗
1 =( V x




0 =( V x
1 − V x
0 ). (4)
Replacing values (3) and (4) in the asset equations (1) and (2) gives the second order equation







=( r + h)p∗
0 (5)
Consequently, the probability to quit the destination market,h− p∗
1, is a decreasing function
of π1 . Conversely, the probability to enter the market,p ∗
0, is increasing with potential proﬁts.
Intuitively, the more the revenues in the foreign market x a r eh i g h ,t h em o r et h eﬁrm will try
to enter or to stay in this market.
2.2 With Credit Constraints
Now, assume that the ﬁrm faces binding credit constraints. As suggested by Chaney (2005),
there are reasons to believe that ﬁrms may face credit constraints when ﬁnancing their export
activities. Export investments are intrinsically riskier than domestic ones, due to information
asymmetries and contract incompleteness that are more pervasive in international transactions
relative to domestic ones We consider two subcases. First, that credit constraints play on the
propensity of the ﬁrm to ﬁnance the recurrent ﬁxed costs to maintain its market. Second, or
alternatively, it plays on the capacity to mobilize liquidity to gain a new destination. Sunk
and ﬁxed trade costs may include learning about the proﬁtability of potential export markets,
making investments in capacity, product customization and regulatory compliance, or setting
up and maintaining foreign distribution networks (Manova, 2010).
1. Case 1: Recurrent costs are binding
Assuming that the per period ﬁxed costs to serve a destination market are binding, say
cp2
1/2 ≤ (V x
1 − V x
0 )2/(2cβ2
1) with β1 > 1.T h e l a r g e r i s β1, the tighter the constraint is. By
6convexity, the optimum follows cp1 =( V x
1 − V x
0 )/β1 and still cp0 =( V x
1 − V x
0 ). Replacing these
new values in the asset equations (1) and (2) gives:
(r + h)p0 =
π1
c








(r + h)(p0 − p∗
0)=( 1− 1/β1)2p2
0/2 > 0. (7)
Then p0 <p ∗
0 and thus p1 <p ∗
1. Finally the propensity to quit the destination x is naturally
higher than in the unconstrained case, but the eﬀort to gain a market is also reduced. Intuitively,
the opportunity cost of a new destination is magniﬁed by the higher risk of losing this market.
2. Case 2: Foreign market entry costs are binding
Assuming that the entry costs to gain a destination are binding, say cp2




0) with β0 > 1. By convexity, the optimum follows cp0 =( V x
1 − V x
0 )/β0 and
cp1 =( V x
1 − V x
0 ).Then
(r + h)(p1 − p∗
1)=−(1 − 1/β0)2p2
1/2 < 0. (8)
Then, contrary to the case 1, p1 >p ∗
1. Intuitively, because of the liquidity constraint, it is more
diﬃcult to regain a lost market; so, the ﬁrm increases its eﬀorts to avoid to lose the destination.
On the contrary, as in the case 1, p0 <p ∗
0. This intuitive property can be formally proved with a
simple absurd reasoning: assume that both p1 >p ∗




because they are less costly for the constrained ﬁrm; Since this last choice is optimal without
ﬁnancial constraints, it is better for the constrained ﬁrm than the optimal constrained choice
(p0, p1); Impossible.
In both cases, the credit/liquidity constraints reduce the probability to gain the destination.
But, their impact on the probability to quit the foreign market is ambiguous depending on the
nature of the constraint. If the credit constraints hurt the capacity to ﬁnance recurrent costs
both entry and exit are reduced. However, when the credit constraints mainly bind the ﬁnancing
of entry costs, the model predicts that entry is reduced but ﬁrms tend to increase their eﬀort
to preserve their positions on foreign markets. Therefore the eﬀect of credit constraints is an
empirical matter that we will test in the next sections.
7Figure 1:
3D a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
We construct our dataset from custom data gathered by the French custom services and from
proﬁt and loss and balance sheet data gathered by the Banque de France. The dataset has several
advantages that make it particularly well suited for analyzing the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints
on ﬁrms export entries and exits. First, the dataset contains information on ﬁnancial variables
that allow to construct ﬁrm-level measures of ﬁnancial constraints. Second, for each ﬁrm it
allows us to precisely observe its exports to any destination in a given year. A ﬁnal advantage
of the dataset is that it includes an important number of small and medium ﬁrms that are
particularly likely to be aﬀected by ﬁnancial constraints. The dataset contains information on
an average of 42,000 ﬁrms operating in the manufacturing sector during2 the period 1995-2007.
The main data source is the French Customs database. This database is a very comprehensive
source of information on national exports. It reports the amount of exports and the country
of destination, for each ﬁrm located on the French metropolitan territory covering close to the
totality of the value of national trade (97%). For each ﬁrm it allows to precisely observe its
exports to any destination. In our database there are about 170 countries of destination.
For our empirical analysis, we reﬁne the deﬁnition of exporting status and thus of entry
in and exit from a market. Let vict, the value exported by the ﬁrm i in country c at date t.
We deﬁne a export entry (or a newly created export relation) whenever we observe that a ﬁrm
exports to a destination the current year but did not export to that destination the previous
two years: vict−2 =0and vict−1 =0and vict > 0.I no p p o s i t et e r m s ,w ed e ﬁne an export exit
(or a terminated relation) whenever we observe that a ﬁrm exported to a destination during the
previous years, but it does not currently export to that destination in the current year nor in
2Although the sources of data also contain information on ﬁrms in service sectors, we restrict our attention
to the manufacturing sector for the shake of homogeneity. Exports in the services sector are quite diﬀerent from
manufacturing since not all the services are traded.
8the next year: vict−1 > 0 and vict =0and vict+1 =0 . By considering two lags when constructing
the entry and exit variables, we assume that ﬁrms completely lose their sunk startup costs if
they are absent from a market for two years. This is in line with previous empirical evidence
suggesting that sunk start-up costs depreciate very quickly and that ﬁrms that most recently
exported two years ago have to pay nearly as much to re-renter foreign markets as ﬁrst time
exporters (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das et al., 2007).
We complement the exports data with information on ﬁrm’s balance sheet from the FIBEn
database, a large French ﬁrm-level dataset constructed by the Banque de France. The FIBEn
database is based on ﬁrms’ ﬁscal documents, including balance sheet and proﬁt and loss statements,
and thus includes information on both stock and ﬂow account variables. Using this information
we construct a number of ﬁnancial ratios that we use to measure credit constraints. In addition,
we obtain ﬁrm-level information on trade credit defaults from an internal longitudinal database
of the Banque de France to construct a proxy for credit constraints: payment incidents, which
we describe in detail below together with the description of the complete set of ﬁnancial ratios.
The merge of the diﬀerent datasets and the lack of data for some observations leave a maximal
sample of about 30.000 ﬁrms. The resulting dataset is fairly representative of the population
of French ﬁrms. Table 1 reports mean and standard deviations for the main variables used in
the empirical analysis, including the ﬁnancial measures for credit constraints, which we describe
in the next subsection. The sample is unbalanced. It includes about 16% of all exporting
ﬁrms, covering about two-third of the top 1% exporters and accounting for about 40% of total
French exports. Compared to most empirical studies, the sample includes ﬁrms of various sizes,
especially numerous small ﬁrms that account for the great majority of the observations: the
median employment is rather low 30 workers. On average, these ﬁrms serve 8.5 destinations,
and enter or exit from slightly more than one foreign market each year, according to the above
deﬁnitions of entry and exit. There are therefore a sizeable number of entries and exits from the
export market each year.
3.1 Measuring Credit Constraints
We use four diﬀerent variables to measure ﬁrm-level credit constraints (see table 2). Existing
studies on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrms’ investment typically compute the cor-
relation between ﬁrm investment and measures of ﬁrm internal liquidity or external debt to
identify credit constraints (e.g. Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Signiﬁcant correlations are typically
interpreted as ﬁnancial markets having an eﬀect on ﬁrm investment and denoting ﬁnancing con-
straints. We build on this literature to construct standard variables that are typically used to
measure ﬁrm ﬁnancial constraints. Table 3 gives the list and description of the variables used



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We start by using a measure of credit constraints that has been used extensively in the
literature: ﬁrm liquidity, measured by the ratio of short term debt to current assets. This is an
indicator of the general indebtedness of the ﬁrm, which shows whether short-term liabilities are
backed with relatively liquid assets. A high liquidity ratio indicates lower ﬁrm ability to meet
its current obligations and less liquidity. If current liabilities exceed current assets then the ﬁrm
may have problems meeting its short-term obligations and ﬁnancing its investment. In addition
such ﬁrms may face bigger hurdles in accessing external sources of capital, so they may also be
more credit constrained (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).
Second, we use a commonly used measure of trade credit: the amount of trade payables as
a share of turnover. This is a standard measure in the trade credit literature that measures
the amount of credit that is extended to the ﬁrm by its suppliers (See e.g. Levchenko et al.,
2010; Love et al., 2007). The higher the trade credit, the more the credit suppliers allow ﬁrms
delaying paying their bills, and thus the more working capital the ﬁrm has to ﬁnance other
investments (Cuñat, 2007). We take the inverse of the trade credit ratio, so that an increase in
ratio represents an increase in ﬁnancial constraints.
The third measure of ﬁnancial constraints that we use is the ratio of equity to total assets,
that is the share of the total assets that are owned by the ﬁrm’s shareholders. This is a standard
ratio to evaluate the overall ﬁnancial stability of a company, or the ﬁrm ability to repay its debts
if all assets were to be sold. To the extent that owner’s equity is often not considered as eligible
for collateral when ﬁrms try to secure a business loan, a high assets to equity ratio indicates
easier access to external ﬁnancing or lower credit constraints. In the analysis we use the inverse
of this ratio, equity to total assets, so in line with the other proxies an increase in the ratio
represents an increase in ﬁnancial constraints.
Finally, a unique feature of our dataset is that it contains information on ﬁrms that are
11credit strapped because they cannot access external banking ﬁnance. Since 1992 all French
banks have a legal obligation to report any previous default on trade creditors to the "Système
Interbancaire de Télécompensation" within four business days. These defaults on trade credit
are called payment incidents. The Banque de France aggregates this information on payment
incidents and makes it available to commercial banks on a weekly basis; so banks can evaluate the
current trustworthiness of potential clients and adjust their lending accordingly. In addition,
ﬁrms that have no more payment incident are removed from this “black list’ after one year.
Aghion et al (2011) are the ﬁrst to exploit these longitudinal data on payment incidents and show
that being notiﬁed on that list under the heading “incident de paiement” is indeed negatively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with a ﬁrm’s access to loans during the next year. Thus suggesting
that ﬁrms that had a payment incident in the past year are credit constrained. Based on this
information we follow Aghion et al (2011) and build a proxy for credit constraints as a binary
variable equal to 1 whenever the ﬁrm has experienced at least one payment incident during the
previous year, and zero otherwise. Actually, as in Aghion et al. (2011), we observe that the
number of payment incidents nor the level of these incidents for a given year are more correlated
with the interest variables than the binary variable. This observation is consistent with the
interpretation that more than their precise ﬁnancial situation, being black listed is the main
channel capturing by the payment incident variable.
Table 3 reports the correlation between our four measures. While the liquidity ratio and
payment incident are positively correlated, the correlation between equity to asset ratio and
the three other measures are virtually null. The inverse trade credit ratio is even negatively
correlated with the liquidity. This conﬁrms that these various variables may provide com-
plementary indirect measures of credit constraints.
4E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
The theoretical model in Section 2 implies that credit constraints inﬂuence the number of newly
served destinations and the number of destinations that ceased to be served by a ﬁrm through
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on the ﬁnancing on trade costs. To test these theoretical
predictions we run a set of speciﬁcations and model the count of the number of newly served
destinations by a ﬁrm and the number of destinations stopped to be served as a function of a
ﬁrm’s credit constraints.
Consider Ni,entry the total number of export destinations to a which a ﬁrm i begins to
export in a given year t,a n dNi,exit the total number of export destinations to which ﬁrm i
ceases to export in year t. Since the number of entries and exits can take only discrete and
positive values, we assume each of these variables is governed by a Poisson process. In order
to account for overdispersion, we use a negative binomial speciﬁcation which generalizes the
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Poisson distribution by introducing an individual, unobserved eﬀect into the conditional mean.3
The conditional expectation of the number of entries or exits (denoted both as Yit for simplicity
in notation) as a function of ﬁnancial constraints can be then expressed as:
E(Yit|Xit−1)=e x p ( βFCit−1 + Zit−1Φ + ηi + τt + εit)
= exp(βFCit−1 + Zit−1Φ + ηi + τt) ∂i (9)
where Yit denotes the number of entries or exits and FCit−1 measures ﬁnancial constraints.
Yit follows a negative binomial Yit ∼ NB(λ,λ + ϑλ2) where the parameter ϑ is a measure of
overdispersion. The coeﬃcient of main interest β measures the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints
on the number of entries or exits. Following the intuition from the theoretical model, credit
constraints reduce the probability to serve a new foreign destination. This would be reﬂected
in a negative and signiﬁcant β coeﬃcient on the number of entries. On the other hand, credit
constraints may have a positive eﬀect on the number of exits, β>0, if ﬁnancial constraints
diminish the ﬁrm ability to ﬁnance the recurrent ﬁxed costs to stay in an export destination.
Alternatively ﬁnancial constraints may have a negative eﬀect on the number of exits, β<0, if
ﬁnancial constraints force ﬁrms to increase their eﬀorts to avoid losing the export destination,
as suggested by Eq. (8) in the theoretical model.
The rest of the explanatory variables included in the vector Zit−1 control for a set of ﬁrm
3We also considered the Poisson distribution, but given that dependent variables display a signiﬁcant amount
of overdispersion (the variance is larger than the mean) we preferred to estimate a Negative Binomial model that
accounts for overdispersion.
13characteristics that inﬂuence the probability to enter or quit the export market . As suggested
by equation (5) in the theoretical model the probability to quit the destination market is a
decreasing function of ﬁrm proﬁts in this market π1.F o l l o w i n gal aMelitz (2003) models, we
assume that proﬁts π1 on this market are an increasing function of the size of the ﬁrm Y and the
technological advance of the ﬁrm γ. More precisely, in such models, the size and the productivity
level are joint. In our reduced form, in order to take into account the maximal heterogeneity
(Redding, 2010), we control both for the size of the ﬁrm measured by the total number of
employees, and for the technological level measured by the ﬁrm total factor productivity. Total
factor productivity is estimated based on the Solow residual method.4. Additionally, we control
for the total number of export destinations served by the ﬁrm. All the explanatory variables are
lagged one year to avoid potential simultaneity bias. Finally, ηi is a ﬁrm speciﬁc idiosyncratic
eﬀect and τt is a full set of year dummies that control for macro eﬀects, such as exchange rate
changes or other macroeconomic shifts.5 Note that the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects also control for time
speciﬁc trends since the explained variables reﬂect changes in the number of export destinations.
5 Baseline Results
5.1 Eﬀects on Credit Constraints on Export Entries
We look ﬁr s ta tt h ee ﬀect of credit constraints on the number of newly served destinations.
Table 4 presents the baseline results of estimating equation (9) with the number of entries as a
dependent variable using a ﬁxed-eﬀect negative binomial. Each of the columns of Table 4 refers
individually to a diﬀerent measure of credit constraints. The results conﬁrm the theoretical
hypothesis that credit constraints restrict ﬁrm access to new export markets. The coeﬃcients
on credit constraints are negative and strongly signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations, regardless of the
proxy used to measure credit constraints.
The variables of main interest are the variable measuring ﬁrms’ credit constraints. A negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the credit constraints variables suggests that credit constraints are
associated with lower export entries. The ﬁrst column of Table 4 reports the results using as a
proxy for credit constraints the liquidity ratio. The coeﬃcient on the liquidity ratio is negative
a n dh i g h l ys i g n i ﬁcant at the 1 percent level. This result indicates that ﬁrms with a higher
l e v e lo fd e b th a v ed i ﬃculties to ﬁnance entry costs into new export destinations. Given that
the liquidity ratio can be interpreted as a measure of the ﬁrm’s lack of collateral, this result
suggests that highly indebted ﬁrms may have problems to raise external ﬁnancing to cover entry
4For a detailed description of the estimation of total factor productivity
based on the Solow residual, together with the approach used to construct the stock of capital see Irac (2007).
Data are similar to ones used in Askenazy et al. (2011). If we remove TFP or employment, the magnitudes of
the estimated key coeﬃcients are slightly larger
5Alternatively, we clustered observations according to ﬁrm Ids. In that case, the estimated coeﬃcients (not
reported) for the various measures of credit constraints are larger and more signiﬁcant.
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costs into a new destination. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by the negative and highly signiﬁcant
estimated relation between the equity to total assets ratio and the number of export entries in
the second column. This result indicates that less solvent ﬁrms enter a smaller number of export
markets.
In column 3, the inverse of the trade credit ratio has a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect
at the 1 percent level on the number of export entries. As discussed above, there is evidence
that ﬁrms often rely on trade credit rather than on bank credit to ﬁnance their production and
export costs (Levchenko et al., 2010). The negative eﬀect of the inverse trade credit ratio on the
number of newly served export destinations indicates that the higher the volume of trade credit
the larger the number of newly served export destinations possibly because ﬁrms can ﬁnance
entry costs. The results in column 4 also suggest that ﬁr m sh a v i n gh a dap a y m e n ti n c i d e n ts e r v e
a smaller number of new destinations. To the extent that as shown by Aghion et al (2011) a
payment incident decreases the ﬁrm ability to borrow from external sources, this result suggests
that limited access to external ﬁnance reduces ﬁrms’ ability to ﬁnance new export investments.
The results from the control variables are in line with expectations. Firm size, as measured
by the log of total employment, always has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of
export entries suggesting that larger ﬁrms establish export relations with a larger number of
export destinations. Second, the positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity suggests
that more productive ﬁrms enter a larger number of export markets. This result suggests that
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because more productive ﬁrms earn bigger revenues, they can ﬁnance the entry costs into a
larger number of export destinations. Finally, the negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the total
number of export destinations on new entries indicates that the higher the number of export
destinations served by the ﬁrm, the less likely the ﬁrm is to add a new export destination to its
portfolio.
5.2 Eﬀects of Credit Constraints on Export Exits
We now investigate the eﬀect of credit constrains on the number of exits from the export market.
The theoretical model predicts an ambiguous eﬀect of credit constraints on the probability to
survive in the export market. The model suggests that credit constraints will aﬀect negatively
ﬁrm survival if credit constraints prevent ﬁrms from ﬁnancing recurrent ﬁxed export costs.
However, credit constrains will have a positive eﬀect on survival if ﬁrms intensify their eﬀorts
to keep an export destination because they know that ﬁnancing re-entry into the export market
would be diﬃcult precisely because of credit constraints.
In Table 5 we present our baseline results of estimating Eq. (9) with the number of exits as
the dependent variable using a ﬁxed-eﬀect negative binomial speciﬁcation. Similarly to above
each of the columns of Table 5 refers individually to a diﬀerent measure of ﬁnancial constraints.
The coeﬃcients on the credit constrains variables are positive and signiﬁcant, regardless of the
16credit constraint proxy, indicating that credit constraints are associated with a larger number
of export exits.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports the results on the standard measure of ﬁrm liquidity
-the ratio of short term debt to total assets. The results indicate that a higher liquidity ratio
is associated with a higher number of exits from the export market suggesting that indebted
ﬁrms have diﬃculties to ﬁnance the recurrent ﬁxed period costs to keep an export destination.
As discussed in the theoretical section, we may expect that recurrent costs are binding if credit
constraints are driven by lack of collateral, but may be alleviated by suﬃcient trade credit. The
results in the second column of Table 5 conﬁrm this intuition. The positive coeﬃcient on the
inverted trade credit variable indicates that ﬁrms with a lower share of trade credit over turnover
(a higher ratio) stop serving a larger number of export destinations suggesting that less trade
credit is associated with lower probability of export market survival.
The other two credit constraints proxies, the equity to total assets ratio and the payment
incidents variable, further have a positive eﬀect on the number of exits at the 1 and 5 percent
signiﬁcance level respectively. The positive eﬀect of the equity to total assets ratio suggests
that lower ﬁrm solvency makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnance the recurrent ﬁxed trade costs. While the
positive eﬀect of the payment of incident variable indicates that ﬁrms that fail to repay their
creditors in the past exit a larger number of export destinations than those ﬁrms that duly
pay their creditors. This result suggests that payment incidents by reducing external ﬁnance
to ﬁrms limit the ﬁrm ability to keep ﬁnancing their activity in export markets. As before the
results from the control variables are in line with priors. Larger and more productive ﬁrms
stop serving a smaller number of export destinations. The positive coeﬃcient on the number
of export destinations further suggests that the higher the total number of export destinations
served, the higher the number of exits.
Comparing the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of credit constraints on the number of exits
versus the number of entries the diﬀerent credit constraints proxies deliver diﬀerent intuitions.
First, internal liquidity seems to matter more for the ﬁnancing of the recurrent ﬁxed export
costs than for the ﬁnancing of the sunk entry costs. Meanwhile, the eﬀect of debt seems to
matter more for the ﬁnancing of new export destinations. These results may suggest that while
internal liquidity is more important for ﬁnancing the recurrent export costs, external ﬁnancing
may be needed to ﬁnance the sunk entry costs. The size of the eﬀect of the two other proxies on
the number of entries and exits is very similar, suggesting that access to trade credit and lack
of access to external ﬁnancing because of a payment incident inﬂuence similarly the ﬁnancing of
the ﬁxed and entry costs of export.
To sum up, all the results presented in this section provide support to the predictions of
the theoretical model. The results using alternative measures of ﬁnancial constraints suggests,
ﬁrst, that credit constraints have a negative impact on the expansion of ﬁrms activities abroad
through their negative impact on the number of newly
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served export destinations. Second, that credit constraints not only seems to deter ﬁrm
entry into export markets, but also seems to have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm survival in the export
market by increasing the probability that a ﬁrm exits export markets and thus the number of
exits.
In addition, the magnitudes of the estimated impacts are quite similar to ones for entry
ﬂows. Actually, credit constraints are associated with both a reduction of entry and an increase
of exit. Thus, the net estimated impact of ﬂows may become large. For example, a ﬁrm facing a
one standard-deviation rise of the inverse trade credit ratio may experience a net loss of about
0.5 destinations; if this rise maintains 5 years, the cumulative impact reachs 2.5 destinations,
while exporting ﬁrms in our sample serve on average 8.5 destinations. So, the magnitude of
our results is comparable to the ﬁndings of papers which examine the cross-section exporting
status of ﬁrms. In the next section we investigate the robustness of the results along several
dimensions.
186 Extensions and Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 Eﬀe c to fC r e d i tC o n s t r a i n t so nD i ﬀerent Types of Exporters
The previous results investigate the eﬀects of credit constraints on all exporting ﬁrms. However,
we may expect diﬀerent eﬀects of credit constraints on ﬁrm export entries depending on whether
a ﬁrm is a new exporter or it already exported in the past. Financial constraints may deter ﬁrm
entry more willingly if ﬁrms are ﬁr s tt i m ee x p o r t e r sb e c a u s et h e s eﬁrms may have more trouble
raising external ﬁnancing for their export expenditures because they don’t have a previous
export record. Alternatively, although our model abstracts from this possibility for simplicity,
ﬁrms that were already serving the export market may use export revenues generated in other
markets to ease their ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁnance entry into other export markets. Campa
and Shaver (2002) suggest that exporting ﬁrms are less tied to the domestic cycle, and less
subject to ﬁnancial constraints because they enjoy diversiﬁcation beneﬁts if economic activity
in the markets in which they sell is not perfectly correlated.
To test whether the eﬀect of credit constraints on the number of newly served destinations
diﬀers for continuous exporters, as compared to all ﬁrms, we estimate equation (9) with the
number of entries as dependent variables only on the sample of continuous exporters. These are
deﬁned as those ﬁr m st h a te x p o r ti nt, and also exported in t−1 and t−2. The results reported
in ﬁrst panel of Table 6 suggest that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints on entry is negative and of
very similar size as that on the sample of all ﬁrms that also contains new exporters, suggesting
that ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect similarly continuous and ﬁrst time exporters.
Next, we investigate whether ﬁnancial constraints matter diﬀerently for ﬁrms that quit the
export markets altogether as opposed to ﬁr m st h a te x i ts o m ee x p o r td e s t i n a t i o n s ,b u ts t i l lk e e p
some presence abroad. We may expect the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints to have a larger eﬀect
on ﬁrms that exit completely the export market. To test this hypothesis, we estimate equation
(9) over the sample of ﬁrms that stay in the export market. The results reported in second panel
of Table 6 suggest that the eﬀects of credit constraints on the number of exits are positive and
of very similar magnitude as for the complete sample of ﬁrms, including also ﬁrms that quit the
export market altogether.
6.2 Alternative Deﬁnitions of Entry and Exit
By considering two lags when constructing t h ee n t r ya n de x i tv a r i a b l e s ,w ea s s u m et h a tﬁrms
completely lose their sunk startup costs if they are absent from a market for two years. An
additional advantage of our preferred measure is that it abstracts from possible statistical noise
in the recorded entries and exits. However, evidence based on French ﬁrm-level data by Buono
et al. (2008) suggests that entries and exits into the export market are very frequent and ﬁrms
enter and exit many markets from one year to the other. To verify that our results are not driven
by the deﬁnition of entry and exit we re-estimate the baseline model considering an alternative
19more standard deﬁnition. For any two subsequent years we alternatively deﬁne a export entry
(or a newly created export relation) whenever we observe that a ﬁrm does not export to a
destination the previous year but it exports there the year after (xict−1 =0and xict > 0).I n
opposite terms we deﬁne a export exit (or a terminated relation) whenever we observe that a
ﬁrm exported to a destination the previous year, but it does not export there the year after
(xict−1 > 0 and xict =0 ) .
Table 7 reports the results using these alternative deﬁnitions of entry and exit. The results
are in line with the previous ﬁndings using the baseline deﬁnitions. Overall credit constrains
have a negative eﬀect on the number of newly created export destinations. The coeﬃcients
on the credit constraints variables are negative, signiﬁcant and of similar or a bit smaller size,
except for the payment of incident proxy, which is no longer signiﬁcant. The second panel of
Table 7 further conﬁrms that credit constraints have a positive eﬀect on the number of export
exits. However, the coeﬃcient on the liquidity and the payment incident variable is no longer
signiﬁcant.
6.3 Remarks on endogeneity
Although in the previously discussed results we include ﬁxed eﬀects and lag the explanatory
variables, this may not completely correct for endogeneity and omitted variable bias. A more
satisfying approach would be to use instruments to control for endogeneity bias. Some in-
struments are natural for payment incidents. For instance, one possibility would be to use
information on the supply of credit available to the ﬁrm. Following Amiti and Weinstein (2009),
a good candidate would be the health of banks providing credit to ﬁrms. However one would
have to match ﬁrms with banks which, given data available, would be extremely diﬃcult for
large ﬁrms and impossible for SMEs. A less demanding approach would be to use information
on the overall characteristics of the credit supply available to the ﬁrms, such as the number
of bank establishments in the region the ﬁrm is located in. Used in a cross section analysis
such indexes of local banking supply (e.g. by Minetti and Zhu (2011)) would have little or no
time variability, therefore it would not be possible to used them in our ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects speci-
ﬁcation. A promising possibility would be to use existing information on the payment incidents
by creditors of the ﬁrms: we may consider as exogenous the negative shock for a ﬁrm due to
non payment by its creditors. However, these data are not still available for research and should
require investigation on their quality.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a simple theoretical model to study the role of ﬁnancial imperfections on the
expansion and survival of ﬁrms in export markets. The main predictions of the model are that
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ﬁnancial constraints hinder the expansion of ﬁrms into new export markets. But their impact on
export survival is ambiguous depending on the nature of the constraint. We test these predictions
u s i n gd a t ao nF r e n c hﬁrms containing information on ﬁrms individual export destinations and
on several proxies for ﬁrms’ credit constraints. Our large dataset allows controlling for ﬁrm
heterogeneity.
We ﬁnd that credit constraints are associated with fewer newly served export destinations.
Furthermore, we also ﬁnd that credit constraints seem to have a positive eﬀect on the number
of exits from the export market suggesting that credit constraints decrease ﬁrm export survival.
We perform a number of sensitivity checks and show that these ﬁndings are not sensitive to the
measure of ﬁnancial constraints, nor to the particular deﬁnition of ﬁrm entry or exit.
These results have implications for the understanding of ﬁrm trade dynamics and show a
potential role for credit market imperfections on a country’s aggregate exports. Credit market
imperfections decrease ﬁrms ability to gain new markets and decrease ﬁrms export survival. This
in turn has an eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms exporting in an economy and on aggregate exports.
The results are also consistent with the prediction of the model that credit constraints besides
acting on the capacity to ﬁnance entry costs, inﬂuence ﬁrms’ capacity to ﬁnance recurrent costs
on a foreign market. This distinction may be useful for directing the public support to exporters.
The magnitude of the estimated connection between our measures of credit constraints entry
and exit from foreign market is apparently small. However, cumulatively, year after year, credit
21constraints may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the extensive margin of trade. So, credit constraints may
be a partial candidate for the bad exporting performances and the relative decline of French
exports observed during the 2000 decade
There are future extensions we plan to undertake. First, along with using additional data to
correct for endogeneity, the paper may be extended through an exploitation of other dimensions
of the customs database. Our empirical strategy collapses the information on destination of
exports into (the change in) the number of destinations. An alternative strategy, would be
to estimate logit models modeling the dependent variable as the existence of a positive ﬂow
to a given destination. However a possible drawback of this approach is that the number of
observations would be huge and we would only be able to introduce the country dimension in
the left-hand-side of the equation whereas the payment incidents variable would remain ﬁrms-
time speciﬁc. Second, future work will also estimate logit models for French exports to speciﬁc
markets (US, Germany, China, etc.). These would have the advantage of providing us with
country speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients on the eﬀects of credit constraints on exports. Indeed it would be
interesting to know for instance if credit constraints are more binding for exports to remote or
less ﬁnancially developed countries.
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